According to the Political Economy Theory, Economic and political structures can to affect managers, auditors and investors behavior in the face of the Financial reporting. One of the best examples of political and macroeconomic actions in recent years is the economic sanctions against Iran. Companies in Tehran Stock Exchange also inevitably have influenced by the pressures of economic sanctions against Iran. The purpose of this paper is to determine the effect of economic sanctions on the value relevance of Financial statements. The data have been analyzed using a sample of 165 listed firms in the Tehran Stock Exchange during from 2001 to 2014 and panel data regression models. The results show that the value relevance of net income and book value of equity reduced in the period of economic sanctions. In addition, the value relevance of Financial statements in the Destress firms has affected by economic sanctions more than other companies.

Introduction and Objectivesanctions have long been one of the most critical external shocks shaping the dynamics of Iran’s economy. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been repeatedly subjected to unilateral and multilateral sanctions, particularly by the United States and its allies, which have targeted key Financial and energy sectors. These sanctions disrupt Financial transactions, limit international trade, and impose barriers on capital flows, thereby altering the structure and behavior of domestic markets.      In a non-sanctioned environment, investors typically diversify by entering competing or parallel foreign markets, effectively managing investment risk across multiple asset classes. sanctions, however, restrict such options, forcing investors to rely more heavily on domestic markets and alternative assets such as cryptocurrencies. These shifts in investment strategies highlight the importance of understanding how sanctions affect network causal relationships among domestic Financial markets.      Clause 22 of Iran’s Resistance Economy policy emphasizes mobilizing national resources and improving resilience against external pressures. Understanding inter-market spillovers under sanction conditions is thus vital, not only for academic knowledge but also for policymaking, portfolio management, and systemic risk assessment. The present study aims to analyze the spillover dynamics and causal interdependencies among three key markets of Iran—Tehran Stock Exchange, the foreign exchange market, and the cryptocurrency market—over the period 1390–1401 SH (2011–2022 AD).      The primary objectives of the study are: To quantify spillover effects between Financial markets during sanction periods. To identify structural breaks in market interconnections caused by specific sanction episodes. To evaluate the systemic role of each market as a transmitter or receiver of shocks. To provide evidence-based recommendations for policymaking in line with the Resistance Economy strategy. 2. Methods and MaterialsTo capture the time-varying interdependencies between markets, the study employs the Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregression (TVP-VAR) model. This model, introduced by Primiceri (2005) and further extended by Koop & Korobilis (2014), allows parameters to evolve over time, making it suitable for capturing the dynamic and nonlinear nature of Financial linkages, especially during turbulent periods such as sanctions. Data and Period: The dataset covers the period from 16/11/1390 (February 2012) to 20/10/1401 (January 2023), using daily observations. Markets Analyzed: Tehran Stock Exchange Index (TPI) – as a representative of equity performance. Foreign Exchange Market – USD/IRR daily free-market exchange rate. Cryptocurrency Market – Bitcoin returns as the leading cryptocurrency. Variables: Logarithmic daily returns of each market were calculated to ensure stationarity and comparability. Sources: Exchange rates were collected from the Central Bank of Iran, stock data from BourseView, and Bitcoin prices from com. Analytical Approach: A baseline VAR model was constructed to identify inter-market interactions. TVP-VAR was employed to account for parameter changes across time. Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (GFEVD) was used to measure spillover intensities, following the approach of Diebold & Yilmaz (2012). Sensitivity analysis was conducted in two ways: (a) event-by-event (individual sanctions such as the Central Bank sanction, sanctions on energy and Financial sectors, and sanction on 18 Iranian banks), and (b) comprehensive (aggregating sanctions into five distinct phases). The TVP-VAR model enables computation of: Total Connectedness Index (TCI): The average level of network spillovers across markets, representing systemic risk. Net Spillover Index (NET): Identifies whether a market acts as a net transmitter (positive NET) or receiver (negative NET) of shocks. 3. Research FindingsThe results from sensitivity analysis revealed key insights into how sanctions reshaped inter-market relationships: -Event-specific analysis: Central Bank Sanction (2019): TCI rose from 3. 22% to 5. 54%, reflecting a 67% increase in inter-market connectedness. The stock market remained a net receiver, foreign exchange a strong transmitter, and cryptocurrency shifted toward greater vulnerability. Financial and Energy Sector sanctions (2018): TCI increased from 3. 26% to 5. 17%. Cryptocurrencies’ role weakened dramatically, showing nearly zero spillover transmission, while the stock market’s negative NET deepened. 18 Bank sanctions (2020): The most disruptive sanction. TCI rose from 3. 24% to 5. 15%. Here, the cryptocurrency market switched roles from transmitter to receiver, highlighting its fragility under systemic banking restrictions.  -Comprehensive phase analysis: Dividing the entire period into five phases provided clearer patterns: Phase 1 (Pre-JCPOA withdrawal): Cryptocurrency (NET=+0. 67) acted as a transmitter, stock market (NET=−0. 78) and forex (NET=+0. 11) showed mixed roles. Phase 2 (Post-JCPOA withdrawal to Financial/energy sanctions): Forex became the dominant transmitter (NET=+3. 10), while both crypto (NET=−1. 54) and stocks (NET=−1. 56) were receivers. Phase 3 (Financial/Energy sanctions to Central Bank sanction): Forex remained a transmitter (NET=+1. 94), while crypto (−0. 32) and stocks (−1. 61) remained receivers. Phase 4 (Central Bank sanction to 18 Bank sanction): Cryptocurrency briefly resumed a transmitter role (+0. 37), forex (+0. 19) remained transmitter, while stocks (−0. 57) stayed vulnerable. Phase 5 (18 Bank sanction to end of study): A significant structural shift: forex (+2. 41) and stocks (+2. 37) both emerged as transmitters, while crypto turned into a strong receiver (−0. 04). -Total Connectedness Index (TCI): Across all phases, TCI fluctuated between 3. 16% and 6. 63%, peaking during the fifth phase, signaling heightened systemic risk and tighter network integration under sanctions. DiscussionThe findings confirm that sanctions are not only external shocks but also structural breakpoints for domestic Financial markets. Several critical insights emerge: Dominant Role of Forex: The foreign exchange market consistently acted as the primary transmitter of shocks, underlining its systemic importance. This reflects Iran’s heavy reliance on foreign currency markets as both a channel for external shocks and a driver of domestic volatility. Stock Market Vulnerability: The Tehran Stock Exchange was persistently a net receiver of shocks. Its sensitivity to currency volatility and sanctions implies weak hedging capacity and limited resilience. Cryptocurrency’s Dual Role: Unlike forex or stocks, the cryptocurrency market displayed a shifting role, alternating between transmitter and receiver. This duality suggests that crypto markets, while offering temporary alternatives for sanction evasion, are highly unstable and reactive to systemic stress. Structural Shifts Post-2020: The sanctions on 18 Iranian banks marked a turning point, intensifying inter-market connectedness and reshaping roles. This indicates the fragility of Financial intermediation in Iran and the high exposure of cryptocurrencies to institutional restrictions. Policy Alignment with Resistance Economy: The results support Clause 22 of the Resistance Economy policy, highlighting the need for coordinated resource mobilization and risk management strategies in times of external pressure. 5. ConclusionThe study concludes that sanctions significantly alter the causal network structure of Iran’s Financial markets, raising systemic risks and reshaping market roles: The foreign exchange market remains the central transmitter of shocks. The stock market is predominantly vulnerable as a shock receiver. The cryptocurrency market exhibits instability, alternating roles depending on sanction type and timing.      These results highlight the necessity for targeted economic policies to stabilize forex markets, protect equities, and regulate cryptocurrency flows. Without such measures, sanctions will continue to amplify systemic risks and undermine investor confidence. 6. Implications and Future Research1. Policy Implications: Policymakers should prioritize stabilizing the forex market through effective currency management, while designing mechanisms to shield the stock market from external shocks. Additionally, regulated domestic alternatives to cryptocurrencies could prevent spillovers from volatile digital assets. Establishing monitoring institutions for currency and crypto markets will enhance transparency and reduce systemic risks. 2. Investor Implications: Investors should recognize the persistent systemic role of forex and the fragility of equities under sanctions. Portfolio diversification strategies must account for cryptocurrencies’ unstable dual role. 3. Future Research: Comparative studies across other sanctioned economies (e. g., Russia, Venezuela) could provide cross-country evidence on sanction-induced spillovers. Expanding the network to include commodities such as gold and oil would further enrich systemic risk analysis. Methodologically, combining TVP-VAR with wavelet coherence or machine-learning approaches may yield deeper insights into dynamic contagion patterns.

The imposition of Financial messaging sanctions against select states in recent years has proven to be a markedly effective measure within the realm of international affairs. In this context, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) has been particularly targeted by sanctioning entities- such as political blocs and sovereign governments- as a potent instrument to exert coercive pressure on recalcitrant states. This development has, in turn, prompted certain affected states to seek out alternative Financial networks and technological solutions to circumvent the SWIFT system. Concurrently, the advent of recent advancements in Financial and blockchain-based technologies has given rise to the notion of establishing faster, more cost-effective, and more transparent monetary transaction mechanisms as potential replacements for the existing SWIFT infrastructure. This confluence of developments has raised a series of issues in public international law that warrant rigorous examination. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, this article seeks to elucidate the multifaceted legal challenges surrounding the sanctioning of the SWIFT system in the realm of international law. While introducing the significance of SWIFT and exploring the relevant domestic laws in Iran, it critically examines the legitimacy, or lack thereof, of the international sanctions imposed on the SWIFT network. Furthermore, it evaluates the responses of various states to the SWIFT-related sanctions and some of the alternative solutions proposed by governments. Findings suggest that the imposition of sanctions on the SWIFT network has had profound implications on the global Financial landscape. One key consequence has been the acceleration of efforts by sanctioned states to develop and implement alternative Financial messaging systems, such as Russia's SPFS (System for Transfer of Financial Messages) and China's CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System).

Since the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the country has been continuously subject to severe sanctions by the Western countries, especially the United States. In all these years, the U. S. sanctions did not affect Iran’, s economy much, due to the fact that the two countries have no formal relations and as a result, their economies are not, by any means, interdependent. However, Iran’, s economy has been reliant on extensive interactions with the European countries,the EU sanctions against Iran since 2011, therefore, have harshly affected Iran’, s economy and caused adverse social impacts on Iranian lives. In the shadow of Iran’, s dark image in the eyes of the world, one issue that has remained overshadowed by the discussions on the impact and effectiveness of the sanctions, is the severe human rights crises left by the EU sanctions. The key question is what have been the human rights and humanitarian consequences of the EU sanctions for Iran, and how serious have these consequences been for the country? As the author argues in this paper, EU economic sanctions against Iran are considered violations of the three main generations of human rights and are therefore unwarranted. Given this, the resumption of sanctions since 2018 would lead to a human rights disaster in Iran. The effect of these sanctions will not affect the Iranian government, but the Iranian civilians, especially the vulnerable, which will undermine their human dignity.

Analyzing the effects of energy and Financial sanctions on the output gap of the economy of Iran is the aim of this study. To do so, a New-Keynesian DSGE model is used to design the structure of model. In this approach, by defining a shock, energy and Financial sanctions is included into objective functions of the economic agents whereby the behavior of households in subsectors, consumption, capital accumulation and investment spending, and also the behavior of firm in production function and marginal cost are affected by energy and Financial sanctions since 2011. The data in this study is quarterly for the period 1989 – 2014. To this end the output gap is computed by Kalman filter approach and other variables are filtered by Hodrick – Prescott method. Then by using Bayesian methods, the structural parameters are estimated, where, the results from MCMC Statistic, Gelman-Brooks statistic and comparing prior and posterior distribution functions indicate that the results are credible. Finally, the effects of energy and Financial sanctions on the output gap and other variables have been analyzed by stochastic simulation. The results from simulation reveals that by imposing economic sanctions, investment spending, total consumption and the process of capital accumulation declines and the costs associated with output increased thereby the output gap in economy tends to increase. Moreover, from the results of variance decomposition, investment and inflation rate is more influenced by sanctions than other shocks.

Targeted Financial sanctions are actions taken by governments or international institutions against persons and entities with specific characteristics to prevent them from engaging in dangerous activities by restricting their access to Financial resources and services. The main question of the present study is what is the legal nature of targeted Financial sanctions and how it is applied in the legal system? This study shows that many of the criticisms that have entered into this type of sanctions,Like its uncertainty, the deprivation of persons of the right to trial and the right to defense, etc. is incorrect and is due to the confusion of the nature of this institution with punishment. The use of targeted Financial sanctions to prevent the financing of terrorism requires a change in the definition of the crime of terrorist financing, so that in the definition of this crime, in addition to financing terrorist acts, the financing of terrorist organizations and individual terrorists must also be considered. This would result that the competent authorities do not need to establish and prove the connection between the funds and other assets of these persons with a specific terrorist act in order to freezing their property.

During the last three decades, Financial sanctions have been imposed on Iran by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations Security Council. This paper aims at estimating the effect of Financial sanctions on the import of capital and intermediate goods in Iran, which was carried out for two independent time periods. The first period (2010-2013) includes multilateral Financial sanctions, and the second period (2016-2019) includes multilateral sanctions and the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA. We examined the impact using the difference-in-difference (DID) method. The results of the first period indicate that the decrease in the imports of capital and intermediate goods in Iran depends more on the countries that "provided the sanctions plan" than the countries that did not provide the sanctions plan, because the coefficient of dummy variable for implementation in the random effects model is statistically significant. The negative effect of 0.007 on imports shows that the effect is weak, because this group of countries behaved differently. In the second period, the random effects model is statistically significant. In this model, the negetive effect of 0.22 on imports indicates a significant effect. Therefore, the reduction of Iran's imports in this period depends more on the countries that provided the sanctions plan than the countries that did not provide the plan.

Objective: In this research, the effect of central bank sanctions on the accumulation of Financial capital of the private sector will be investigated in the framework of a Post-Keynesian model of SFC. The reason for using this model is the suitability of the post-Keynesian approach to the research topic. Post-Keynesian market economics states that if the social is to be realized automatically, the government must step in as a market firm that aims or changes the outcome in a desirable way, with minimal interventionist policies, to achieve social action. Post-Keynesians are against the role of the government in the economy and believe that the markets need the support of the government in order to manage the management.Method: In this research, macroeconomic modeling was done with an accounting approach. This approach gained popularity after the Great Financial Crisis of 2007, which brought macroeconomic problems to many developed countries. The matching model used in this research provides the possibility of connecting the real and Financial aspects of the economy in a coherent and integrated framework, which is an important advantage of these models compared to the common classical models. The research model is made in such a way that it records the changes made in the whole system when one of the parameters is modified by changing the behavior of each of the parts involved in the model. This feature allows the model to reflect the consequences of fiscal or monetary policy as well as exogenous shocks such as sanctions and shows how the balance sheets of individual sectors are interdependent .First, the model is estimated using the data of Iran's economy for the period 2010-2015, and then this model is simulated to create a basic scenario for the period 2001-2011, based on which the shock effects of the central bank sanctions in three scenarios, weak sanctions (in which 80% of foreign exchange resources return to the country), moderate sanctions (in which 50% of foreign exchange resources return to the country) and strick sanctions (in which only 20% of foreign exchange resources return to the country) for a period of 50 It has been simulated and analyzed.Findings: The results of the research show that sanctioning the central bank and restricting its access to foreign exchange resources resulting from the trade surplus can have adverse effects on other sectors of the economy in addition to the central bank itself. Sanctioning the central bank will reduce the accumulation of Financial capital of the private sector, which can disrupt the economic production by reducing the resources necessary for private sector investment and create the grounds for the economy to enter recession. Also, the extent of this effect depends on the severity of the sanctions, and with the tightening of the sanctions, the accumulation of Financial capital of the private sector is more affected. If the sanctions are permanent, it will cause the Financial capital of the private sector to reach its stable state after a few years of reduction (depending on the severity of the sanctions), at a lower level than before. The thing to think about is that the more severe the sanction, in addition to a sharper decrease in the Financial capital variable, it will take much longer for the variable to reach a stable state. This time will be about 10 years for a weak permanent embargo, about 15 years for a medium permanent embargo, and about 20 years for a severe permanent embargo.Conclusion: According to the post-Keynesian theories, the duty of the government is to intervene in the economy and prevent the formation of recession. In this regard, the effect of the two expansionary Financial policies of increasing government spending and reducing taxes that the government can do is to prevent the reduction of Financial capital accumulation. The private sector was investigated. The results of the research showed that these policies have a positive effect on the accumulation of Financial capital of the private sector and Yolet can reduce the severity of the negative effects of sanctions on the accumulation of Financial capital of the private sector by applying them. This means that if the government wants to prevent the reduction of the accumulation of Financial capital of the private sector due to the sanctions of the central bank, it has to impose a budget deficit on itself. It is clear that the government's budget deficit has consequences for Iran's economy. Whether the government's intervention in the economy is the right thing to do in this situation or not, it needs further study and examination and comparison of the negative consequences of the government's budget deficit and the decrease in the accumulation of private sector Financial capital in Iran's economy. But what emerges from the results of the research is that the sanction of the Central Bank has harmful effects and consequences on the Iranian economy and affects all sectors of the economy.

Introduction: In recent years, the use of Financial sanctions has been unprecedented. Financial sanctions aim to exert economic pressure in order to change the political behavior and the performance of governments under sanction. The economic sanctions were imposed on Iran's economy in 2006, and further restrictions were put on Iran's access to the Financial network of the United States. The Financial sanctions were intensified in 2011 under the pretext of nuclear and human rights issues. sanctions also reduced the share of capital expenditures in the budget and the government expenditures for safety net. When the government faced a budget deficit and the imports became more expensive, the resulting inflation increased the cost of living for the low-income groups. Therefore, Financial sanctions adversely affected the poor due to the disruption of Financial flows. Generally, during sanctions, the government budget deficit can deteriorate income inequality. sanctions can not only block the Financial transactions of a country and deter investments but also pose trade barriers; it leads to increased challenges in paying for exports and imports. Financial sanctions also affect imports because they impede the transfer of money, which leads to a shortage of one or more goods. In these circumstances, the sanctioned country tries to replace the import of goods from other countries in order to circumvent the sanctions; But this also causes a shortage of goods and increases their prices. Thus, economic sanctions reduce the supply of necessary goods. Rising prices, especially commodity and food prices, in turn, can increase inequality. sanctions reduce the import of health and pharmaceutical products, and, as a result, citizens' access to these goods is reduced; most of all, the vulnerable segments of the population are affected, especially women, children and the elderly people. sanctions on imports through capital goods and intermediaries reduce domestic production, employment and income, which leads to an increase in absolute poverty and a reduction in exports of labor-intensive goods. This, in turn, reduces the level of income and employment in the target country and leads to increased inequality. In Iran, the decline in non-oil exports happened by the above-mentioned mechanism. in addition to it, there occurred reductions in oil exports and the government foreign exchange revenues. sanctions have strong effects on economic aspects, including reduced government investment, depreciated exchange rates, declined government spending and possibly reduced safety net payments. These changes can increase inequality. Methodology: We examined the impact of Financial sanctions on income inequality in Iran over the period of 1991-2017. To this end, we used a Factor Augmented Vector Auto-Regression (FAVAR) model with time varying parameters (TVP). We utilized MATLAB 2016 to estimate the econometric model. FAVAR models with time-varying parameters provide an estimate of the Financial sanctions proxy variable (oil revenues) and then indicate the response functions in the foreign debts of the central bank, liquidity, economic growth, informal exchange rates, inflation and unemployment. Results and Discussion: Iran's economy has been exposed to economic shocks emanating from Financial sanctions and represented by a proxy that shows the oil revenues fluctuation. A corresponding model was used to provide an analysis of the impacts of the Financial sanctions on the Gini coefficient. Over time, due to the changes in the coefficients of the variables in the FAVAR structural model, it was possible to analyze the effects of the shock on the economic conditions using time-varying parameters (TVPs). Conclusion: Nonlinear behavior indicates the effectiveness of variables on the Gini coefficient. Thus, economic growth improves the Gini coefficient over time, but the other variables adversely affect it. Given that the Financial sanctions adversely affected the inflation rate, exchange rate and unemployment as well as increased the foreign debts of the central bank, it can be concluded that the sanctions aggravated the Gini coefficient and increased income inequality. In fact, the increasing Financial sanctions prevented the transfer of oil revenues and the import of staple goods. It also raised the inflation rate which led to the higher inequality of income distribution. Therefore, the sanctions adversely affected the Gini coefficient and inequality in Iran.

Economic and political structures in the capital market pressures can affect managers, auditors and investors behavior in the face of the Financial reporting. One of the best examples of political and macroeconomic actions in recent years is the economic sanctions against Iran. Companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange also inevitably have been influenced by the pressures of economic sanctions against Iran. The purpose of this paper is to determine the effect of economic sanctions on the Information content of Financial statements. The data has been analyzed using a sample of 165 listed firms in the Tehran Stock Exchange during from 2001 to 2014 and panel data regression models. The results show that the information content of Financial statements reduced in the period of economic sanctions. Also, reduction in the Financial information content of loss-making companies and firms with high earnings management during the period of intensifying economic sanctions has been more than reduction in other companies.